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MEDICAL-MALPRACTICE REFORM: IS
ENTERPRISE LIABILITY OR NO-FAULT A
BETTER REFORM?
Abstract: This Note compares two medical-malpractice reforms: enter-
prise liability and no-fault. The Note compares the reforms for their
relative ability to compensate injured patients and deter malpractice.
The Note also examines the reforms' economic and sociopolitical
feasibility. The Note concludes that a no-fault medical-malpractice
system would better compensate patients and deter malpractice, but
enterprise liability is a more feasible reform that policymakers should
pursue more aggressively.
INTRODUCTION
In November 2000, a man was admitted to the hospital for a bro-
ken hip) The doctor on duty inserted a feeding tube to ensure that
the patient received proper nutrition. 2 The doctor accidentally in-
serted the tube into the patient's lung, which began to fill with liq-
uids Despite being transferred to the hospital's critical care unit, the
patient never recovered. 4 A jury found that medical malpractice
caused his death. 5
In the fall of 2004, a senior partner of an OB/GYN clinic in Chi-
cago sent her patients letters informing them she would be moving to
Madison, Wisconsin where medical-malpractice insurance premiums
are lower.° Although, a lifelong resident of Chicago, who had found
the practice of medicine to be challenging and rewarding, the mal-
practice environment. in Illinois made it a hostile place for the doctor
to work.?
Medical malpractice harmed this patient and doctor, but in two
very different ways. 8 One story illustrates that real lives are lost or ru-
1 Lagerstrom v. Myrtle Werth Hosp.-Mayo Health Sys., 700 N.W.2d 20], 206 (Wis.
2005).
2 Id.
3
Id. at 207.
5 Id. at 206.
6 A111€11.1 BLIrligaS, Priced Out, CAPITA[. Timis (Madison, WI), Sept. 27, 2004, at BA.
7 Id.
8 See Lagcrstmm, 700 N.W.2d at 206-07; Enrages, supra note 6, at 8A.
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fined because of medical malpractice. 9 The other story paints a picture
of a litigious America hurting the doctor-patient relationship by driv-
ing doctors out of business.° Ideally, medical malpractice law com-
pensates injured patients and deters doctors from injuring their pa-
tients." Although medical-malpractice law has helped raise the
standard of care in the medical profession, it has become a source of
frustration for physicians and inadequate protection for patients.°
The problems with the current medical-malpractice system are
numerous.° Doctors are sued much more often than in the 1950s. 4
Medical-malpractice liability insurance is less available and less afford-
able, forcing some physicians to leave the profession as a result.°
Those doctors continuing to practice sometimes provide unnecessary
treatment to protect themselves from liability.° This "defensive medi-
cine" is dangerous and costly; 44,000 to 98,000 people die each year
because of medical error. 17 There are many more injuries caused by
compensable medical errors than there are malpractice claims.°
9 See Lagerstrom, 700 N.W.2d at 207; see also Watkins v. Cleveland Clinic Found., 719
N.E.2d 1052, 1057-59 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998) (involving a patient in a persistent vegetative
state due to surgery to fix a deviated septum in her nose).
1° See Burages, supra note 6, at 8A; see also David A. Hyman, Medical Malpractice and the
Tort System: What Do We Know and What (If Anything) Should We Do About It?, 80 Tex. L. Rev.
1639, 1639 (2002); Paul C. Weiler, The Case for No-Fault Medical Liability, 52 MD. L. REV. 908,
909-10 (1993); Patrick B. Massey, M.D., Despite Top-Notch Physicians, Medical Field Showing
Signs of Illness, CliscAGo DAILY HERALD, Jan. 5, 2004, at Health & Fitness 4.
1 ' Sec STEVEN E. PEGALIS & HARVEY F. WACIISMAN, AMERICAN LAW OF MEDICAL MAL-
PRACTICE 2n § 2:10 (1992).
12 See Helling v. Carey, 519 P.2d 981, 985 (Wash. 1974) (making glaucoma tests stan-
dard practice for ophthalmologists); Lagerstrom, 700 N.W.2d at 206-07; Burages, supra note
6, at 8A.
13 Sec INST. OF MED., TO ERR Is HUMAN 1 (2000); PEGALIS & WACIISMAN, supra note 11,
§ 2:7; Weiler, 514pro note 10, at 912.
14 In the late 1950s, there was approximately one malpractice claim per hundred phy-
sicians in a year. Weiler, supra note 10, at 912. By the early 1990s, there were more than ten
claims per hundred physicians per year. Id.
16 See REPUBLICAN NAT'L COMM„ 2004 REPUBLICAN PARTY PLATFORM: A SAFER Wm.') A
MORE HOPEFUL AMERICA 59 (2004), available athttp://www.gop.com/media/2004p1atform.pdf.
16 See Weiler, supra note 10, at 916-17.
17 See 1NST. OF MED., supra note 13, at 1; PEGALIS & WACHSMAN, supra note 11, § 2:7
(defining defensive medicine as the alternation of modes of medical malpractice, in-
duced by the threat of liability, for the principal purpose of forestalling the possibility of
lawsuits by patients as well as providing a good and legal defense in the event such lawsuits
are instituted"); Weiler, supra note 10, at 942(estimating the cost of defensive medicine at
$20 billion per year).
18 Seel4yman, supra note 10, at 1643; Weiler, supra note 10, at 913.
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These problems demonstrate the need for reform.' 9 The public
should not have to bear the cost of an arguably ineffective and
inefficient medical-malpractice system that inadequately distributes
costs and hinders patient safety. 20
Medical-malpractice reforms have been enacted over the past
thirty years, but complaints continue about the medical-malpractice
system.21 The most popular reforms include damage caps, attorney
contingency fees caps, installment payments for damages, screening
boards, and shorter statutes of limitation for malpractice actions. 22
Where enacted, the damage caps have reduced the number of suits,
the amount of damages, and, therefore, the overall cost of medical
malpractice." Unfortunately, malpractice-insurance rates remain
high.24 The savings, although real, are small in comparison to the
overall cost of healthcare in the United States. 25 As a negative conse-
quence of these reforms, patients with legitimate claims and severe
injuries face greater difficulties when bringing medical-malpractice
suits. 26 Thus, despite these tort reforms, problems persist. 27
In light of the futility of popular tort reform efforts, and with an
eye toward improving patient safety, some reformers have suggested
19 See Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., U.S. Health-Care Coverage and Costs: Historical Develop-
ment and Choices for the Future. 21 j.L. MED. & ETHICS 141, 142 (1993); Weiler, supra note 10,
at 916-17.
2° Sec Barry R. Furrow, Enterprise Liability and Health-Care Reform: Managing Care and
Managing Risk, 39 Si. Louts U.	 79, 100-08 (1994); Weiler, supra note 10, at 908-09.
21 See Am. MED. ASS'N., MEDICAL LIABILITY REFORM —NOW! 2-22 (2004), available at
http://www.ama-assn.org/go/m1rnow  (describing the recurring problem of medical-
inalpractice liability and the reforms in states); Steve Lohr, Bush's Next Target: Malpractice
Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2005, at BUI (illustrating current interest in medical-
malpractice reform).
22 See Randall R. Bovbjerg, Legislation on Medical Malpractice: Further Developments and a
Preliminary Report Card, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 499, 513, 522-31 (1989); Weiler, supra note
10, at 908-09.
25 See Am. MED. ASS'N., supra note 21, at 23; Bovbjerg, supra note 22, at 546-53.
24 Sec REPUBLICAN NA•'L COMM., su pm note 15, at 59.
25 Weiler, supra note 10. at 909; MC NATI. CFR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS,
UNITED STATES, 2004 wren CHARTBOOK ON TRENDS IN THE H FAI:111 OF AMERICANS 14, 326
(2004) (stating national healthcare expenditures totaling more than $1.5 trillion in 2002
have been growing); KAISER FAMII.Y FOUND., TRENDS AND INDICATORS IN 'IlIE CHANGING
HEAcrn CARE MARKEITLACE 2004, Exh. 1.1: National Health Expenditures and Their
Share of Gross Domestic Product, 1960-2003, http://www.kff.org/insurance/7031/Ii2004-1-
set.cfm.
26 See ASS'N OF TRIAL LAWYERS or AM., Ten Reasons to Oppose Medical Malpractice °Reform",
hup://wwwatlanet.org/ConsumerMediaResources/Tier3/press_room/FACTS/medinal/
tenreasons0504.aspx (last visited Apr. 7, 2005).
27 See Am. MED. ASS'N., supra note 21, at 2-22 (describing the recurring problem of
medical-malpractice liability and the reforms in states).
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changing the medical-malpractice system. 28
 One such proposed re-
form, enterprise liability, would shift liability entirely away from indi-
vidual healthcare providers to hospitals or similar institutions. 29 Even
more aggressive reformers have suggested replacing the fault based
negligence system with a no-fault strict liability system that would
compensate injured patients even if the provider was not negligent in
causing the injury.39 Acknowledging the hurdles related to enactment,
both enterprise liability and a no-fault strict liability system offer the
possibility of improving the affordability and quality of healthcare de-
livered in the United States. 31
To better understand the utility and feasibility of these systemic
medical-malpractice reforms, this Note compares enterprise liability
and no-fault.32 Enterprise liability retains the fault requirement of the
negligence based medical-malpractice system, but limits the liability to
the hospital or equivalent enterprise. 33 The no-fault reform takes en-
terprise liability a step further by eliminating the fault requirement. 34
Part I describes the history of medical-malpractice law and the devel-
opment of enterprise liability and no-fault as potential reforms. 35 Part
II addresses the question of which is the better reform model. 35
 Be-
cause medical-malpractice reform is a frequent topic of public debate,
the theoretical models of reform should be weighed against one an-
other before investing limited resources in implementation.37 Part II
2B See Kenneth S. Abraham & Paul C. Weiler, Enterprise Medical Liability and the Evolution
of the American Health Care System, 108 Hmtv. L. Ruv. 381,398-400 (1994); Weiler, supra
note 10, at 919-21.
29 See Abraham & Weiler, supra note 28, at 398-400; John V. Jacobi & Nicole
Huberfeld, Quality Control, Enterprise Liability, and Disintermediation in Managed Care, 2911—
MED. & Ern ics 305,305 (2001).
30 David M. Studdert & Troyen A. Brennan, Toward a Workable Model of "No-Fault" Com-
pensation for Medical Injury in the United States, 27 Am. J.L. & MED. 225,227-29 (2001); Wei-
ler, supra note 10, at 919-21.
3 ' See Abraham & Weiler, supra note 28, at 382-84; Jacobi & Huberfeld, supra note 29,
at 305; Studdert & Brennan, supra note 30, at 227-29; David M. Studdert et al., Can the
United States Afford a "No-Fault" System of Compensation for Medical Injury?, 60 LAw & CON-
TEMP. PROBS., Spring 1997, at 1, 33; Weiler, supra note 10, at 919-20.
32 See infra notes 178-386 and accompanying text.
33
 Exclusivity determines whether the enterprise would be the only party a patient/
plaintiff could sue. See HEALTH-CARE LAw AND ETHICS 458 (Mark A. Hall et al. eds., 6th
ed. 2003). Under an exclusive enterprise liability system. a patient may only sue the hospi-
tal or other comparable enterprise for an injury. Id. Under a nonexclusive enterprise li-
ability system, a patient may sue the hospital as well as individual providers. Id.
34 Studdert Brennan, supra note 30, at 227-29; Weiler, supra note 10, at 919-21.
35 Sec infra notes 39-173 and accompanying text.
36 See infra notes 174-386 and accompanying text.
37 See Lohr, supra note 21, at BU I.
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concludes that no-fault better serves the goals of compensation and
deterrence, but enterprise liability is a better model for reform in the
United States because enterprise liability is more economically, so-
cially, and politically appropriate. 38
I. BACKGROUND
A. History of Medical Malpractice
To understand how either no-fault or enterprise liability might im-
prove the healthcare system, it is helpful to understand the history and
evolution of the U.S.'s current negligence-based medical-malpractice
system.39
 In the early part of the 19th century, actions against physicians
for medical malpractice were rare. 4° As the century progressed, people
began to demand more from their healthcare providers.'" Additionally,
the medical profession became populated with doctors toting a wide
range of treatments, not all of which were scientifically sound or effec-
tive.42 As a result, patients increasingly held doctors accountable for
inadequate care.43
 By 1850, medical-malpractice suits had become a
fixture of the American healthcare system."
In the late 1950s, there was approximately one malpractice claim
per 100 physicians in a year. 45
 By the early 1990s, there were more titan
ten claims per 100 physicians in a year. 46
 The increased number of
malpractice claims has caused financial and emotional strain on the
healthcare systenl. 47
 These strains reached their height in the malprac-
tice "crises" of the mid-1970s and mid-1980s. 48
 These crises were charac-
58 See infra notes 376-86 and accompanying text,
59 See Furrow, supra note 20, at 80-100 (discussing the evolution of the health system
and liability).
48 James C. Mohr, American Medical Malpractice Litigation in Historical Perspective, 283
JAMA 1731, 1731 (2000).
41 See id. at 1732.
4: id.
43 Id.
44 Id. at 1731-32.
45
 Weiler, supra note 10, at 912.
48 Id.
47
 Sce id at 908-10. Although the healthcare system has been strained by medical-
malpractice claims, it is also important to note that medical-malpractice law has improved
healthcare and patient safety. See Paul A. Sarlo, Shining a Light on. Malpractice, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb, 15, 2004, at 14NJ. Although this Note focuses on the problems of the medical-
malpractice system, it does not discount the positive effect medical-malpractice law has
had on healthcare. See id.
48 See Studdert & Brennan, supra note 30, at 225.
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terized by a surge in malpractice claims with corresponding increases in
malpractice insurance rates. 49 In 1974 and 1975, major insurers refused
to continue writing coverage for medical-malpractice liability." In the
1980s, businesses of all kinds were struggling to find affordable liability
insurance. 51 These insurance crises resulted in frustration with the tort
system, which prompted legislative interest in general tort reform, and
in particular in medical-malpractice reform. 52 The 1970s and 1980s re-
forms included insurance reforms, limiting attorney contingency fees,
damage caps, and instituting pretrial screening panels."
In the 1990s, no similar insurance crisis materialized, but pres-
sure from medical practitioners fueled continued interest in reform. 54
More states enacted damage caps and similar federal legislation came
close to passage. 55 Despite intense debate over healthcare reform dur-
ing the Clinton Administration, the Administration's comprehensive
reforms were not enacted." The Clinton plan considered moving the
nation toward an enterprise liability system, but the American Medical
Association (the "AMA") strongly opposed giving hospitals more con-
trol over physicians.57
Without any reforms enacted in the 1990s, medical-malpractice
reform continues to be a topic of national debate." The 2004 Repub-
lican Party Platform specifically advocated non-economic damage
caps as a reform, and it attacked Democrats for curtailing reform ef-
forts and siding with trial lawyers instead of doctors and patients.59
During the 2004 presidential debates, President George W. Bush
highlighted medical-malpractice reform as a means to alleviate
healthcare costs and improve the quality of healthcare in America. 60
Democratic presidential candidate Senator _John Kerry conceded that
49 AM. MED. ASS'N., supra note 21, at 2-3; Studdert & Brennan, supra note 30, at 225.
50 Bovbjerg, supra note 22, at 502-03.
51 See id. at 503.
52 See id. at 503-04.
53 See id. at 513.
54 RANDALL R. BOVRIERG, MEDICAL. MALPRACTICE: PROBLEMS & REFORMS (1995), up-
dated and reprinted in HEAurit-CARE LAW AND ETHICS, supra note 33, at 480.
" Id.
56 See Abraham & Weiler, supra note 28, at 382-83. See generally TIIEDA SKocrot., Boo-
M ER.ANG:
	
REFORM AND THE TURN AGAINST GOVERNMENT (1997).
57 See Abraham & Weiler, supra note 28, at 383.
58 See Lohr, supra note 21, at BU1.
59 REPUBLICAN NAT'L. Comm., supra note 15, at 59. For comparison, the 2004 Demo-
cratic Party Platform is available at littp://www.democrats.org/pdfs/2004pIatfortn.pdf.
60 See Comm'n on Presidential Debates, Debate Transcripts (Oct. 8, 2004), http://
www.dehates.org/pages/tmns2004c.html.
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the medical-malpractice system needed reform, but he considered
tort reforms, like damage caps, to be an inadequate approach to re-
ducing healthcare costs or improving care." Their limited exchange
exemplifies the heated debate being waged in Congress and in state
legislatures throughout the country. 62
The debate is largely waged in state legislatures by two factions,
one typically led by physicians, and the other by plaintiffs' attorneys."
The physicians and their supporters lobby for reforms that limit pa-
tients' ability to bring suits and recover damages." This school of
thought believes that by reducing the number of suits and the
amounts plaintiffs recover, insurance rates will fall, doctors will be
happier and more effective, thereby curbing healthcare costs," Re-
forms advocated by physicians include damage caps, limiting attorney
contingency fees, installment payments for damages, screening boards
to filter claims, and shorter statutes of limitation to reduce the time a
patient would have to file a claim." These reforms have been selec-
tively adopted in many states.67
On the other side of the debate, plaintiffs' attorneys, patients'
rights advocates, and like-minded supporters oppose these reforms and
argue that such reforms unfairly limit plaintiffs' rights and do little to
improve healthcare." They stress that by making it more difficult for
plaintiffs to bring suit, these reforms limit patients' ability to demand
quality care.69 For example, this school of though alleges that damage
caps disproportionately harm the most severely and grossly injured vic-
tims of medical malpractice. 7° Furthermore, plaintiffs' attorneys and
patients' rights advocates argue that tort reforms are futile efforts to
61 See id.
62 See Am. MUL ASS'N., supra note 21, at 24-15; Lohr, supra note 21, at BU1.
63 See 2004 REPUBLICAN NAT'L COMM., supra note 15, at 59; Abraham & Weiler, supra
note 28, at 383; Daniel Costello, Asking Patients to Help Shoulder Malpractice Costs, L.A.
TIMES, Oct, 25,2004, at Fl.
" See Am. Milt. ASS'N„ supra note 21, at 23-45; Lohr, supm note 21, at BUI.
See Am. MED, ASS'N„ supra note 21, at 23.
66 See id. at 23-24.
67 See id.
68 SeeJohn Gibeaut, The Med-Mal Divide, 91 A.B.A. J. 38,40 (2005); Lohr, supra note 21,
at BU 1.
66 See Lohr, supra note 21, at BUI.
" See WASHOE COUNTY REGISTRAR OF VOTERS, WASIIOE COUNTY 2004 GENERAL ELEC-
TION SAMPLE BALLOT Rebuttal to Argument in Support of Question No. 3 and Argulltelli Against
Question No. 3, S6-E to 57-E (2004).
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contain costs." They contend that limitations on patients' rights are
not justified by an imperceptible reduction in healthcare costs. 72
As long as healthcare providers continue to feel unfairly bur-
dened by the medical-malpractice system, debate over reform propos-
als will probably remain on the state and national agendas." The
AMA is a powerful lobbying force, and the stories of doctors being
forced out of practice by prohibitively high costs of medical-
malpractice-liability insurance has potent political force.74 Voters and
legislators, while sympathetic to doctors, are quick to see plaintiffs
and attorneys as greedy and litigious." Until this changes, medical
malpractice promises to remain a salient issue of public debate.'"
Any reforms that are implemented should thus improve the
healthcare system. 77
 Some scholars argue that typical tort reform has not
significantly improved the healthcare system over the past three decades
and it is difficult to see how more of these same reforms will make a dif-
ference in the future. 78
 These scholars have proposed more novel arid
71 See Comm'n on Presidential Debates, supra note 60 (statement of Senator John F.
Kerry) ("Now, ladies and gentlemen, important to understand, the president and his
friends try to make a big deal out of it. Is it a problem? Yes, it's a problem. Do we need to
fix it, particularly for OBGYNs and for brain surgeons and others? Yes. But it's less than 1
percent of the total cost of health care."). Empirical evidence shows that medical malprac-
tice only accounts for a small proportion of total healthcare costs. Weiler, supra note 10, at
909. In 1992, the total cost of healthcare in the United States was $840 billion. Id. A gener-
ous estimate of the cost of medical malpractice at that time was $9 billion. Id, This figure
may have underestimated the full cost of the malpractice system, however, because it does
not include the cost of defensive medicine. See id. at 909, 916, 942. Medical malpractice is
blamed for causing doctors to order unnecessary tests and procedures to protect them-
selves from liability. See id. at 909, 916-17. Such "defensive medicine" was estimated to cost
the healthcare system another $18 billion in 1992, bringing the total cost of medical mal-
practice to $27 billion. Sec id. Even this $27 billion figure is small relative to the total cost of
$840 billion. See id. These numbers have only continued to grow. Sec Bovbjerg, supra note
15, at 45. In 2001, the cost of healthcare in the United States was 14.1% of the country's
gross domestic product, and it has been steadily rising. Sec id. In 2002, the total cost of
healthcare was nearly $1.6 trillion. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., supra note 25. Although the
relatively small cost of medical malpractice tempers the urgency with which the nation
needs to tackle malpractice reform, the medical-malpractice system does cause meaningful
problems for healthcare providers and patients alike. W. John Thomas, The Medical Mal-
practice "Crisis": A Critical Examination of a Public Debate, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 459, 464 (1992);
%Yeller, supra note 10, at 916-17.
72 See Comm'n on Presidential Debates, supra note 60.
78 See e.g., Abraham & Weiler, supra note 28, at 383; Gibeaut, supra note 68, at 40; Lahr,
supra note 21, at BUI.
74 See Abraham & Weiler, supra note 28, at 383.
75
 See Weiler, supra note 10, at 910.
78
 See Lohr, supra note 21, at BU1.
77
 See 1Ns .r. or MED., supra note 13, at 3.
78 See Studdert & Brennan, supra note 30, at 225-26.
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systemic reforms including enterprise liability and no-fault systems."
The following two sections describe. these reforms and their history in
greater detail."
B. Enterprise Liability
Advocates first proposed enterprise liability as a systemic reform
for the medical-malpractice system in the 1970s. 8' The reform pro-
posal evolved out of the steady development of caselaw holding hospi-
tals liable for patient injuries. 82 Not long ago, the idea of holding a
hospital liable for the torts of its physicians was far-fetched." Early
American hospitals were charitable institutions where the sick and
poor would go to die." Those who could afford healthcare treatment
stayed home and had doctors come to them." Courts dismissed the
idea of holding a charitable hospital vicariously liable for the negli-
gent acts of a physician." At that time, hospitals simply provided a
venue for doctors to perform their duties." Hospitals exercised little
or no control over doctors, leading courts to distinguish easily the
hospital-doctor relationship from the typical employer-employee rela-
tionship that gives rise to vicarious liability." Additionally, these early
hospitals may not have been able to keep their doors open to the sick
and poor if they had been shouldered with vicarious liability." There-
fore, courts established a doctrine of charitable immunity for hospi-
tals, which clearly exempted hospitals from vicarious liability for phy-
sicians' acts and from most direct liability for errors in treatment."
78 See Abraham & Weiler, supra note 28, at 436; David M. Studdert & Troyen A. Bren-
nan, No-Fault Compensation for Medical Injuries, 286 JAMA 217, 222 (2001); Weiler, supra
note 10, at 947-948;
83 See infra notes 81-173 and accompanying text.
81 Abraham & Weiler, supra note 28, at 384.
82 Id, at 385-94.
88 See Michael v. Hahnemann Med. Coll. & Hosp. of Phila., 172 A.2d 769, 786 (Pa.
1961) (M mutant] 0,1, dissenting) .
84 See id.
88 See id.
93 See id.; see also McDonald v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 120 Mitss. 432, 434-36 (1876), over-
ruled by Colby v. Carney Hosp., 254 N.E.2d 407 (Mass. 1969); Abraham & Weiler, supra note
28, at 385-86.
87 See HEALTH-CARE Lnw AND ETD WS, supra note 33, at 421-23.
88 See id.; see also Schloendorff v. Soc'y of N.Y Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 94 (N.Y. 1914), abro-
gated by Bing v. Thunig, 143 N.E.2d 3 (N.Y. 1957).
88 See Scldoendorff 105 N.E. at 94; HEM•I/I-CARE LAW AND LTDICS, supra note 33, at
421-23.
93 See McDonald, 120 Mass. at 434-36; Schloendorff, 105 N.E. at 94; Abraham & Weiler,
supra note 28, at 385-86.
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The doctrine of charitable immunity lasted until the 1950s when
the law began to adjust to the changing world of healthcare.9 i By the
1950s, hospitals were less like charitable institutions and more like
sophisticated centers of healthcare delivery. 92 Although physicians
were still independent contractors of hospitals, their relationship with
hospitals became increasingly like an employer-employee relation-
ship.93 As a result, charitable immunity dissolved, causing hospitals to
be held vicariously liable for the negligent acts of physicians when
there is apparent authority or when the hospital negligently hired or
supervised the physician. 94
Currently, hospitals can be held liable for physician negligence
when physicians are held out as hospital employees." If the relation-
ship appears sufficiently similar to that of an employer and employee,
the tort doctrine respondeat superior applies, exposing a hospital to
liability for a physician's negligent acts." As hospitals have become
more involved in the delivery of healthcare, including doctor-patient
relationship and treatment decisions, courts have become more will-
ing to hold them liable for treatment-related injuries, regardless of
the hospital's fault. 97 Now, hospitals can be liable for healthcare re-
lated injuries through vicarious liability and corporate liability. 9a
With hospitals assuming more responsibility for both the provi-
sion and liability of healthcare, reformers and academics began to
consider the state of the healthcare system if hospitals were to assume
all malpractice liability. 99 Under an enterprise liability system, a hospi-
tal is liable for all malpractice regardless of whether the culpable indi-
vidual healthcare provider is an employee, independent contractor, or
91 See Bing, 143 N.E.2d at 8; Abraham & Weiler, supra note 28, at 385-86.
92 See Bing, 143 N.E.2d at 8; Abraham & Weiler, supra note 28, at 385-86.
93 See Adamski v. Tacoma Gen. Hosp., 579 P.2d 970, 978-79 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978);
Abraham & Weiler, supra note 28, at 386-92.
9'1 See President & Dirs. of Georgetown Coll. v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810, 823-24 (D.C. Cir.
1942); Abraham & Weiler, supra note 28, at 386-92. Some states still maintain a diluted
system of charitable immunity where the amount a patient can recover from a nonprofit
hospital is capped. See Note, The Quality of Mercy: "Charitable Torts" and Their Continuing
Immunity, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1382, 1398 (1987) (arguing charitable immunity should be
eliminated where it remains).
95 See Adamski, 579 P.2d at 978-79; Abraham & Weiler, supra note 28, at 386-89.
96 See Adamski, 579 P.2d at 978-79; Abraham & Weiler, supra note 28, at 386-89.
97 See Darling v. Charleston Cmty. klent'l Hosp., 211 N.E.2d 253, 260 (Ill. 1965); Adam-
ski, 579 P.24 at 978-79.
98 Abraham & Weiler, supra note 28, at 393. A hospital could be found liable under a
theory of corporate liability when it, for example, negligently grants staff privileges to an
inadequate physician. See id. at 381, 389, 393.
99 See id. at 393-94.
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holder of admitting privileges.m° An exclusive enterprise liability sys-
tem would allow patients to sue only hospitals, thus insulating indi-
vidual providers from liability)o By limiting the liability to hospitals,
medical-malpractice suits would appreciably simplify, as there would
be only one defendant available to potential plaintiffs) 02
Enterprise liability had a brief moment in the spotlight. in the
spring of 1993 when the Clinton Administration began vetting its pro-
posals for healthcare reform.m The original Clinton plan included a
national system of enterprise liability)" The AMA and the Physician
Insurer Association of America ("PIAA") aggressively opposed this pro-
posal) 05 Although one might expect a physicians' lobbying group to
support legislation that would immunize physicians from medical-
malpractice liability, the AMA believed that by making hospitals exclu-
sively liable for malpractice, physician autonomy would be curtailed by
hospitals and administrators)w The lobbying effort of the AMA and
PIAA succeeded, and the final Clinton proposal only suggested pilot
programs to test enterprise liability) 07 The Clinton reforms ultimately
died in Congress, but enterprise liability has remained a tantalizing
idea for systemic reform to many health-policy experts.I 08
An enterprise liability approach to medical malpractice in the
United States would maintain most of the infrastructure and legal
norms of the current medical-malpractice system. 109 Liability would
still be based on a finding of fault. 11 u The key change would make
1" Sec id. at 393.
I01 See id. at 393-94. A non-exclusive system would still allow patients to sue individual
providers. Sec hi. Individual providers could continue to insure against personal liability as
they do under the current system. See id.
102 SccJacobi & Huberfield, supra note 29, at 307.
1" See Abraham & Weiler, supra note 28, at 382-84; William M. Sage, Unfinished Busi-
ness: How Litigation Relates to Health Care Regulation, 281 HEAcrit Pot,. l'ot.'Y & L. 387, 410
(2003).
104 See William M. Sage, Medical Malpractice Insurance and the Emperor's Clothes, 54
DEPAut, L. REv, 163, 466 n.13, 473 n.44 (2005); Sage, supra note 103, at 382-83; Paul C.
Weiler, Reforming Medical Malpractice in a Radically Moderate—And Ethical—Fashion, 54
DEPAut. L. Itrv, 205, 223 (2005). See generally Symposium, Starting Over?: Redesigning the
Medical Malpractice System, 54 DEPAut. L. Rev. 203 (2005).
1°5
	 Abraham & Weiler, supra note 28, at 383; Sage, supra note 104, at 437 n.44; Sage,
supra note 103, at 410.
1°6 See Abraham & Weiler, supra note 28, at 383; Sage, supra note 104, at 437 n.44; Sage,
supra note 103, at 410.
107 Abraham & Weiler, supra note 28, at 384; Weiler, supra note 104, at 223.
108 See Abraham & Weiler, supra note 28, at 394-95; Weiler, supra note 104, at 223.
1 " See Abraham & Weiler, supra note 28, at 393.
11 ° See id. at 434.
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hospitals assume the legal liability of individual providers, even those
with off-site facilities.'" Doctors would need to submit themselves to
additional control and supervision from hospitals in exchange for
immunity from personal liability for malpractice.'" An enterprise li-
ability system would funnel all malpractice claims to hospitals without
changing the applicable law of negligence." 6
C. No-Fault Liability
No-fault also emerged as a possible systemic reform for medical-
malpractice law in the 1970s. 114 During the malpractice crisis of the
1970s, reformers suggested creating a no-fault system of liability for
medical malpractice similar to the workers' compensation scheme
being developed at the time. 115 In general terms, a no-fault system
would eliminate the need for courts to find doctors or other
healthcare providers negligent for an injured patient to receive corn-
pensation. 16 Instead, a patient would automatically recover for inju-
ries caused by medical care through an administrative system in which
an injured patient would fill out a form and then a review board
would process the claim.'" With the medical-malpractice crisis subsid-
ing and scholars predicting that a no-fault system would be more
costly due to higher compensation rates, interest dissipated." 8
In the last ten years, interest in creating a no-fault medical-
malpractice system has resurged because of its potential to reduce
medical error and improve patient safety." 9 In 2000, the Institute of
Medicine issued a report citing that between 44,000 and 98,000
deaths are caused every year by medical error.'" This report high-
lighted a pressing need to improve the way the U.S. healthcare system
"' See id. at 393-94; Furrow, supra note 20, at 109; Weiler, supra note 104, at 224.
112 See Furrow, supra note 20, at 109,112.
118 See Abraham Sc Weiler, supra note 28, at 434; Weiler, supra note 104, at 224.
1 " Weiler, supra note 10, at 910.
lit Weiler, supra note 10, at . 910-11; see Eleanor D. Kinney, Administrative Law Approaches
to Medical Malpractice Reform, 49 Sr. Louts U. L.J. 45,48 (2004).
118 Studdert et al., supra note 31, at 6; Weiler, supra note 104, at 227; Weiler, supra note
10, at 919-20.
117 See Studdert at al., supra note 31, at 6; Weiler, supra note 10, at 919-20.
118 See Weiler, supra note 10, at 910-11.
19 See Mark A. Hall, Can You Trust a Doctor You Can't Sue?, 54 Drktut. L. REV. 303, 309
(2005); Studdert & Brennan, supra note 79, at 217; Weiler, supra note 104, at 227; Weiler,
supra note 10, at 912.
128
 INST. OF NIFID., supra note 13, at 1.
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identifies and manages error."' Currently, there is not enough incen-
tive for healthcare providers to report errors. 122 Consequently, valu-
able information is being lost. 123 A system that encourages providers
to report errors would provide opportunities to identify recurring er-
rors and ways to correct them. 124 The fault-based medical-malpractice
system provides the opposite incentive because admitting errors is an
invitation to a lawsuit. 125 Recognizing this tension between fault-based
liability and the need to gather information to limit medical error,
reformers have a renewed interest in creating a no-fault system. 128
Under a no-fault system, hospitals would have a strong financial
incentive to gather information about errors and reduce them because
hospitals would be compensating patients for their injuries. 127 Regard-
less of whether the error was an act of negligence or a mistake that did
not breach the standard of care, the hospital would have to compensate
patients for injuries caused by the error. 128 Physicians would be more
willing to discuss cases candidly, including errors, because they would
not be subject to individual liability, and their fault would not affect the
hospital's liability. 129 Thus, a no-fault system could be a catalyst for
significant improvements in patient safety and care.'"
Although the medical-malpractice system is largely based on a
negligence theory of liability, the tort system has pockets of strict li-
ability that could serve as models for a no-fault medical-malpractice
system. 131 Strict liability has deep roots, dating to English common
law. 132 Before negligence became the norm in tort law, tortfeasors
' 21 See id.; David A. Hyman & Charles Silver, The Poor State of Health Care Quality in the
U.S.: Is Malpractice Liability Part of the Problem or Part of the Solution!, 90 CORNELL L. Rev. 893,
896 (2005) (acknowledging the influence of the Institute of Medicine report on malprac-
tice reform).
122 See Lawrence Gostin, A Public Health Approach to Reducing Errol; 283 .]AMA 1742,
1742-43 (2000). But see Hyman & Silver, supra' note 121, at 893.
123 See Gostin, supra note 122, at 1743.
124 See Hall, supra note 119, at 309; Studdert & Brennan, supra note 79, at 219.
128 SeeStuddert & Brennan, supra note 79, at 218-19.
126 See id. at 218; Weiler, supra note 104, at 229-30. See generally Randall R. Bovbjerg &
Frank A. Sloan, No-Fault for Medical Injury: Theory and Evidence, 67 U. CIN. L. Rev. 53
(1998).
177 See Studdert & Brennan, supra note 79, at 221.
128 See id.
129 See id.
136 Sec id.
131 See DAN B. Donnas & PAUL T. HAYDEN, TORTS AND COMPENSATION 556 (4th ed.
2001); Weiler, supra note 10, at 910-11 (discussing worker's compensation as a strict liabil-
ity model for no-fault).
132 HOBBS & HAYDEN, supra note 131, at 590-92.
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were held strictly liable for injuries they caused regardless of their
fault.'" As long as tortfeasors caused an injury, they were liable for
damages.'" Over time, negligence emerged as a fairer approach to
distributing the costs of risks and injuries, but strict liability did not
entirely disappear.'"
Workers' compensation is a contemporary example of no-fault
liability in the U.S. legal system.'" Under workers' compensation stat-
utes, when an employee is injured in the course of employment, the
employer compensates the employee for the injury regardless of the
employer's fault in causing the injury. 137
 All states and the federal
government enacted workers' compensation statutes, most by 1920.'"
These programs, administered by states or private insurers, hold em-
ployers strictly liable for injuries arising in the course of employ-
ment. 139 An employer is liable for fixed amounts that are set out for
specific injuries in the statutes. 14° The employee can recover medical
expenses and lost wages, but cannot recover for pain and suffering. 1-0
Injured employees are entitled to immediate and periodic payments
as long as the disability exists. 142 Disputes are settled by an administra-
tive agency. 143 The system is funded through insurance that employers
are required, or strongly encouraged, to purchase through the work-
ers' compensation statutes.'" A no-fault medical-malpractice system
might resemble the administrative system of workers' compensation,
though a no-fault medical-malpractice system would probably have a
narrower range of compensable injuries. 145
Products liability is another area of strict liability in tort law. 146 A
seller of a product may be strictly liable for injuries caused by the prod-
uct if: (I) the seller is in the business of selling the product, (2) the
product is expected to and does reach the user without substantial
change, and (3) the product was sold in a defective condition unrea-
155 Id,
"4 Id.
In See id.
136 Id at 822.
137 Don AS & HAYDEN, supra note 131, at 822.
138 Id.
139 Id, at 822,827.
14° Id. at 822.
141 Id.
142
 Dorms & HAYDEN, supra note 131, at 822.
145 Id. at 822-23.
144
 Id. at 823.
145 See id. at 822-23; Studdert et al., supra note 31, at 5-9.
146 DoEns & HAYDEN, supra note 131, at 626.
2005]	 Afedical-Malpractice Reform	 1109
sonably dangerous to the consumer." 7 Products liability is already a
part of health law.'" Pharmaceutical and medical device companies are
subject to products liability suits, and the experiences of these indus-
tries provide insight into how to design a no-fault medical-malpractice
system in light of the special needs and issues of healthcare." 9
There even exists a small pocket of no-fault liability in current
medical-malpractice law. 15° Virginia, and Florida implemented no-fault
systems to provide compensation for babies who suffer neurological
injuries during delivery regardless of fault. 151 The programs provide
compensation for these limited injuries regardless of the fault of
healthcare providers,'" The no-fault models in Virginia and Florida
may offer additional guidance for developing a comprehensive no-fault
system.'"
A comprehensive no-fault system liability could use a wide range
of recovery schemes.'" The most liberal models allow for recovery for
all kinds of injuries with no regard for causation, but this would be
expensive and impractical.'" Therefore, a no-fault system should only
allow compensation for limited injuries. 156 Furthermore, any feasible
no-fault system would also offer compensation based on the level of
causation.'"
147 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402(A) (1965); see also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: PRonucTs LtAint.rry § 1 (1998) ("One engaged in the business of sell-
ing or otherwise distributing products who sells or distributes a defective product is subject
to liability for harm to persons or property caused by the defect.").
145 See Laura Pleicones, Note, Passing the Essence Test: Health Care Providers Escape Strict
Liability for Medical Devices, 50 S.C. L. Rev. 463, 464-65 (1999) (discussing a decision of the
South Carolina Supreme Court to hold healthcare providers not strictly liable for defective
medical devices).
145 See Walker v. Johnson & Johnson Vision Prods., Inc., 552 N.W.2d 679, 687 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1996) (holding that common law products liability claims can be brought against
Class Ill medical device manufacturers).
15° See Studdert et al., supra note 31, at 1-2; Weiler, supra note 10, at 936 n.87.
151 Sec Studdert et al., supra note 31, at 1-2; Weiler, supra note 10, at 936 11.87; see also
Maxwell J. Mehlman, Bad "Bad Baby" Bills, 20 Am. J.L. & MED. 129, 129 (1994); Peter 1-1.
White, Innovative No-Fault Tort Reform for an Endangered Specialty, 74 VA. L. REV. 1487, 1487
(1988).
152 See Weiler, supra note 10, at 936 n.88.
155 See id.
154 See Studdert et al., supra note 31, at 10-11.
155 See id. at 6-10.
156 See id.
157 See id,; Weiler, supra note 104, at 227 (suggesting compensation only be provided to
injuries that last at least two months).
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The Swedish system provides a working example of what a no-
fault system could look like in the United States.'" Sweden uses a no-
fault model that compensates injuries caused by treatment that could
have been avoided. 159 In Sweden, if a patient believes an injury was a
result of medical care, the patient fills out an application for compen-
sation, usually with the assistance of a physician. 160 After the patient
files the claim, the treating physician fills out a report. 101 Then, adjus-
tors and physicians working for a national central claims office decide
whether the injury was caused by treatment and whether the injuries
could have been avoided. 152 Only patients with injuries caused by
treatment that could have been avoided receive compensation. 163 Al-
though the causation and avoidability test does not clearly indicate
exactly which treatment injuries deserve compensation, the struc-
tured judgments of the claims office seem to be more predictable and
objective than judgments of negligence. 16 t In addition to requiring
avoidability to merit compensation, Sweden also instituted a disability
threshold to control costs. 165 To be eligible for no-fault compensation,
the patient must have spent at least ten days in the hospital or have
used more than thirty sick days. 166 The Swedish process usually takes
six months from filing a claim to receiving a decision. 167
A no-fault system in the United States would not be exactly like
Sweden's system, but three characteristics of their system can be used
to compare no-fault with enterprise liability as reforms for the United
States.'" First, a no-fault system would require hospitals to pay for
medical errors. 169 In this respect, a no-fault system would be similar to
an enterprise-liability model."° Second, a no-fault system would not
inquire whether treaunent was negligently provided." 1 Rather, an in-
quiry would be made as to whether the injury was avoidable to deter-
158 Studdert et al., supra note 31, at 8.
159
 See id.
14 See id. at 6.
161 See id.
162 See id. at 7.
1 " Studdert et al., supra note 31, at 7.
164 See id.
166 See id. at 8.
166 Id.
167
 Id, at 6.
' 68 See, e.g., Abraham & Weiler, supra note 28, at 434; Studdert et al., supra note 31, at
5-9; Weiler, supra note 10, at 919-20.
169 See Weiler, supra note 10, at 919-20.
1 " See Abraham & Weiler, supra note 28, at 434.
171 Sec Weiler, supra note 10, at 919-20.
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mine liability.'" Third, a no-fault system would use an administrative
body to process claims and make compensation decisions rather than
a court of law.'"
II. ANALYSIS
A. Framework for Analysis
Enterprise liability and no-fault are both sweeping models of re-
form for medical-malpractice law. 174 The two share many characteris-
tics; in fact, enterprise liability is part of the foundation of no-fault.' 75
Although enterprise liability and no-fault have each been discussed in
existing literature, the two have not been explicitly compared to de-
termine which would be a better reform.'" This Part compares enter-
prise liability with no-fault to determine which would be the better
reform model."7
This Note compares the two models on the basis of four factors.'"
The four factors are: (1) the goal of compensation, (2) the goal of de-
terrence, (3) the requirement of economic feasibility, and (4) the re-
quirement of sociopolitical feasibility. 17" Each of these factors are dis-
cussed individually in turn in greater detail, leading to the conclusion
that enterprise liability is the better model for reform because it is
significantly more feasible.m
The first two factors, deterrence and compensation, are often
described as the twin goals of tort law's' Medical-malpractice law simi-
larly serves to prevent injuries and compensate injured patients, 182
Medical-malpractice law deters healthcare providers from harming
patients, and compensates patients for injuries.' 83 Thus, any evalua-
172 Sec Studdert et al., supra note 31, at 7.
179 See id, at 6.
174 See Abraham & Weiler, supra note 28, at 436; Weiler, supra note 10, at 947-48.
176 See Studdert & Brennan, supra note 30, at 227-29; Weiler, supra note 10, at 919-21.
176 See e.g., Abraham & Weiler, supra note 28, at 432-36; Studdert et al., supra note 31,
at 32-34; Weiler, supra note 10, at 997-48.
177 Sec infra notes 181-386 and accompanying text.
178 See infra notes 181-95 and accompanying text.
179 See infra notes 181-95 and accompanying text.
120 See infra notes 181-386 and accompanying text.
181 Sec VEGA	 & WACIISMAN, supra note 11, § 2:10.
182 See id,
183 See id.
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don must consider how the alternatives serve deterrence and corn-
pensation. 1134
In addition to evaluating how an alternative medical-malpractice
system serves deterrence and compensation, the system must also be
feasible. 185 A system's feasibility should be evaluated by its cost and
economic efficiency.'ta Alternative medical-malpractice systems must
be cost-sensitive because the already expensive U.S. healthcare system
cannot afford a more costly malpractice system. 187 A malpractice sys-
tem also should be efficient. 188
 Efficiency in this context measures
what percentage of medical-malpractice costs actually compensate
patients and how quickly malpractice claims are resolved. 1139
Feasibility also should be measured by how well the system fits the
prospective cultural and political environment. 190 A systemic reform
of medical-malpractice must rally support and gain political momen-
tum to be enacted. 191 In addition to political demands, an alternative
medical-malpractice system must meet social and cultural needs. 192
Healthcare is a unique realm of public policy where questions about
life, mortality, and human frailty are ever-present.'" Health problems
can be intensely personal, complicated, and consuming for pa-
tients.'" Systemic changes in medical-malpractice law will have
ramifications that extend far beyond the courtroom. 195
' 84 See id.
lea See Studdert et al., supra note 31, at 3.
1 e6 See id.
187 See NAT'L CTR. FOR HEAL'T'H STATISTICS, supra note 25, at 14, 326 (setting that
healthcare spending in the United States was $1.5 trillion in 2002, 14.9% of the GDP).
188 See Weiler, supra note 10, at 926 (stating the cost of malpractice litigation consumes
fifty-five to sixty percent of every claims dollar).
199
 See id.
190 See SKOCPOL, supra note 56, at 173-78 (discussing the failure of the Clinton Admini-
stration's Health Security proposal and the important role social and political forces
played in bringing about this failure); Weiler, supra note 10, at 947-48.
191 SeeSKocPot., supra note 56, at 173-78; Weiler, supra note 10, at 947-48.
192 See SKOCPOL, supra note 56, at 173-78., Weiler, supra note 10, at 947-48.
193 See ATUL GAWANDE, COMPLICATIONS: A SURGEON'S NOTES ON AN IMPERFECT SCI-
ENCE 4 (2002).
191 Sec id. at 8; Gibeaut, supra note 68, at 44.
195 See Abraham & Weiler, supra note 28, at 436; Studdert et al., supra note 31, at 32-34;
Weiler, supra note 10, at 947-48.
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B. Goal of Compensation
1. Enterprise Liability
A medical-malpractice system should compensate patients for inju-
ries caused by malpractice. 196 An enterprise-liability system would make
compensation more frequent, consistent, and predictable. 07 The cur-
rent medical-malpractice system compensates few patients relative to
the amount. of injuries sustained. 198 Additionally, compensation varies
significantly from case to case. 199 Enterprise liability would improve pa-
tient compensation by streamlining medical-malpractice claims and by
making outcomes more predictable. 20° More injured patients would be
able to receive compensation because malpractice actions would be
simpler and less expensive in so far as plaintiffs would only bring a
claim against one defendant, the hospita1. 201
Enterprise liability also promises to improve compensation by
making claims more predictable. 2°2 Hospitals would become more
experienced with medical-malpractice claims and would be able to
distinguish legitimate claims from frivolous claims more easily. 205
Hospitals might settle more valid claims because their reputations
would not be as vulnerable as the reputations of individual physicians
who are motivated to fight every claim. 204 Hospitals might focus their
resources on fighting frivolous and weak claims and settling stronger
claims.205 Thus, claims would become more predictable and compen-
sation would reflect actual inj uries more closely. 206
106 Ste PECA	 & WACIISMAN, 51/P117 note 11, § 2:10; Weiler, supra note 104, at 227.
107 See Abraham & Weiler, supra note 28, at 401-06; Edward P. Richards & Thomas R.
McLean, Administrative Compensation for Medical Malpractice Injuries: Reconciling the Brave New
World of Patient Safety and the Torts System, 49 Sr. Louts U. U. 73, 89 (2004) (stating that an
enterprise liability system would increase money available to patients and would compen-
sate patients more often because corporate defendants are less sympathetic to juries);
Sage, supra note 104, at 476.
198 See Hyman, supra note 10, at 1643.
I" See id. at 1643-44.
2170 See Abraham & Weiler, supra note 28, at 406.
201 See id. at 403, 406; Weiler, supra note 104, at 224-25.
202 See Abraham & Weiler, supra note 28, at 403; Furrow, supra note 20, at 101, 109.
203 SCC Abnili a rn & Weiler, supra note 28, at 903.
204
 Sec id. at 404; Weiler, supra note 10, at 916.
205 See Abraham & Weiler, supra note 28, at 404, 406 (discussing how damages might be
standardized by an enterprise liability system).
208 Sec id. at 403, 406; Mark Geistfeld, Malpractice Insurance and the (Ii)legitimate Interests
of the Medical Profession in Tort Reform, 54 Dt:PAtn, L. REv. 936, 459-60 (2005) (comparing
damage caps with enterprise liability and finding that enterprise liability would make mal-
practice premiums more representative and fairer).
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Enterprise liability would improve compensation, but maintain-
ing the fault requirement should limit compensation to the same kind
of injuries and claims that are successful under the current system. 207
Enterprise liability would improve compensation largely through mak-
ing the litigation process more efficient and cost-effective. 208
2. No-fault
An enterprise liability system would improve compensation
through gains in efficiency. 20
 A no-fault system would couple these im-
provements with an expansion of compensation to more injured pa-
tients. 210 A study in 1997 tested the economic feasibility of a no-fault
system like Sweden's in Colorado and Utah. 2" The study found that,
even by conservative estimates, two to three times the number of pa-
tients would be compensated in Utah and Colorado respectively, while
only modestly increasing the cost relative to the negligence-based mal-
practice system. 212 A dramatic increase in compensation like this would
alleviate the problem of deserving patients not receiving compensa-
tion. 213
Potential economic problems temper the advantages of the no-
fault system. 214
 A larger number of claimants might spread compensa-
tion resources too thin.215
 Although more patients would be eligible
for compensation, there may not be adequate funds to compensate
these patients meaningfully.216
 Because of limited resources, it may be
better to limit compensation to cases where there has been a judicial
finding of negligence. 217 The goal of compensation would not be well
207
 See Abraham & AVeiler, supra note 28, at 432-33.
208 See id. at 406; Weiler, supra note 104, at 224-25.
209 Sec Abraham & Weiler, supra note 28, at 406; Bovbjerg & Sloan, supra note 126, at
71; Weiler, supra note 104, at 224-25.
21° Sec Abraham & Weiler, supra note 28, at 406; Bovbjerg & Sloan, supra note 126, at
70; Weiler, supra note 10, at 919-20.
211 See generally Studdert et al., supra note 31 (describing the study and presenting its
results).
212 Id. at 29-30.
218 See Barbara Brill, An Experiment in Patient Injury Compensation: Is Utah the Place?, 1996
UTAH L. REV. 987, 1003; Studdert et al., supra note 33, at 29-30.
214 See Mary Ann Kupeli, Survey, Tort Law = No Fault Compensation: An Unrealistic Elixir to
the Medical Malpractice Ailment, 19 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'l, L. REV. 559,568-71 (1996).
225 See Bovbjerg & Sloan, supra note 126, at 73; Studdert et al., supra note 31, at 29 (es-
timating that no-fault liability in Colorado and Utah would have a higher direct cost than
the existing negligence system).
218 See Bovbjerg & Sloan, supra note 126, at 73; Studdert et al., supra note 31, at 29.
217 See Kupeli, supra note 214, at 560. But see Studdert et al., supra note 31, at 33.
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served if a no-fault system opened the door for recovery so wide that
all patients, especially the most severely injured and deserving, would
not be adequately compensated for their losses. 218
3. Which System Is Better?
A no-fault system would be a more effective way to compensate
injured patients than enterprise liability. 218 No-fault promises to com-
pensate a greater number of injured patients more consistently and
appropriately. 22° A no-fault system runs the risk of casting the net too
wide and compensating undeserving patients, but because there are
limited resources available to compensate patients, it is likely that only
legitimately injured patients would be compensated. 221 The social ad-
vantages of assisting people with injuries caused by medical treatment,
even if the injuries were caused by mistakes rather than negligence, are
high.222
In addition to increasing the number of compensable injuries
and parties, a no-fault system would also serve to standardize compen-
sation.223 Currently, the fault-based medical-malpractice system creates
the possibility that one injured patient could hit the metaphorical
jackpot with their medical-malpractice claim and be awarded huge
punitive damages in addition to compensatory damages.224 This
would not change in a fault-based enterprise liability system. 225 These
large awards are designed to serve deterrence goals rather than coin-
pensation. 226 By standardizing compensation under a no-fault system,
the punitive damages would be spread across many injured parties,
thus providing more people with compensation and having compen-
sation better reflect the nature of the injuries sustained.227 Compensa-
tion is not well-served when so few patients recover for their injuries,
nor is it served by having like patients receive different amounts. 228
218 SCC Scudder t et al., supra note 31, at 29.
219 See id. at 33; Weiler, supra note 109, at 227; Weiler, supra note 10, at 921-22.
229 See Stucidert et al., supra note 31, at 29; Weiler, supra note 10, at 921-22.
221 Sec Bovbjerg & Sloan, supra note 126, at 70, 73; Studdert et al., supra note 31, at 29-
31; Weiler, supra note 10, at 921-22.
222 See Studdert et al., supra note 31, at 29-:-31; Weiler, supra note 10, at 921-22.
229 See Bovbjerg & Sloan, supra note 126, at 70-71; Weiler, supra note, 10 at 922.
224 See Weiler, supra note 10, at 922.
225 See id.
229 Sec id.
227 See Bovbjerg & Sloan, supra note 126, at 70-71; Weiler, supra note 10, at 922.
223 Sec Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., Administrative Performance of No-Fault" Compensation
for Medical Injury. 60 Lim & CONTEMN. hums., Spring 1997, at 71,71-72.
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Enterprise liability would not improve compensation nearly as
much as a no-fault system because enterprise liability would continue
to compensate roughly the same inadequate number of patients.229
An enterprise liability system would only improve compensation rela-
tive to the current system by giving hospitals more experience with
malpractice claims, thereby helping them more easily and consistently
settle legitimate claims and oppose weak claims. 230 Although these
improvements should not be overlooked, relative to a no-fault system,
enterprise liability does not serve compensation goals as wel1.231
C. Goal of Deterrence
1. Enterprise Liability
A medical-malpractice system should deter physicians from
committing malpractice and encourage them to provide the best pos-
sible care.232 Enterprise liability would deter physicians from commit-
ting malpractice more effectively than the current system, and im-
prove patient safety. 233 An enterprise liability system would give
hospitals added incentive to gather more data about medical errors,
which might reveal patterns, revealing potential ways to eliminate er-
rors. 234 Additionally, the hospital would have additional incentive to
correct or remove inadequate physicians. 236 Currently, peer review
boards are not effective because there is too much professional cour-
tesy. 236 By imposing liability on hospitals for all medical-malpractice,
hospitals would have a heightened financial incentive to identify phy-
sicians providing substandard care, correct their treatments, or stop
the physicians from practicing.237 Defensive medicine also would be
curbed since physicians would no longer fear being held personally
229 Compare Abraham & Weiler, supra note 28, at 401-06 (discussing the ability of en-
terprise liability to provide compensation), with Weiler, supra note 10, at 922-24 (discuss-
ing how a no-fault system could compensate more patients more equitably than the cur-
rent system).
230 Sec Abraham & Weiler, supra note 28, at 403,406.
231 Compare Abraham & Weiler, supra note 28, at 401-06 (discussing the ability of en-
terprise liability to provide compensation), with Weiler, supra note 10, at 922-24 (discuss-
ing the ability of no-fault to provide compensation).
232 Seel'EnALts & WACIISMAN, supra note 11, § 2:10.
233 Sec Abraham & Weiler, supra note 28, at 407-14; Furrow, supra note 20, at 101.
234 Sec Abraham & Weiler, supra note 28, at 413; Furrow, supra note 20, at 110.
299 Sec Abraham & Weiler, supra note 28, at 413-14; Furrow, supra note 20, at 110.
236 See PtIcAus & WACtISMAN, supra note 11, § 2:10.
237 See Abraham &
	
supra note 28, at 413-14; Furrow, supra note 20, at 110.
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liable for malpractice. 2" Because defensive medicine can result in
unnecessary care, which puts patients at higher risk of iatrogenic in-
jury, a reduction would improve patient safety. 239
Another advantage of an enterprise-liability system would be that,
unlike individual physicians under the current system, hospitals' medi-
cal-malpractice insurance would become experience-rated. 210 This
would mean that hospitals with better safety records would have access
to less expensive insurance.241 This would give hospitals a financial in-
centive to improve patient safety by looking,for systemic improvements
and by pressuring their individual providers to provide better, safer
care.242
The major drawback to an enterprise liability system with respect
to deterrence is that it would lessen the responsibility of individual
physicians to give their patients the best possible care. 243 Deterrence is
sacrificed at the individual level in hopes of making gains in patient
safety by providing greater incentives to gather and analyze data about
medical error. 244
2. No-fault
A no-fault system of liability should also facilitate efforts to im-
prove patient safety. 245 A no-fault system would encourage hospitals to
educate individual providers more aggressively about patient safety
and to discipline them for providing inadequate care. 240 A no-fault
system would magnify the incentives for hospitals to improve patient
safe ty. 247
A no-fault system would hold hospitals liable for a broader range
of injuries caused by medical care than a negligence system. 248 This
increased liability would encourage hospitals to find more ways to re-
238 SEC Abraham & Weiler, supra note 28, at 407-14.
239 See id.; Sage, supra note 104, at 475-76.
240 Sec Abraham & Weiler, supra note 28, at 403-04; Weiler, supra note 10, at 914-15.
"I See Abraham & Weiler, supra note 28, at 403-04, 409-11; see also Geistfeld, supra
note 206, at 460 (stating that enterprise liability would replace individual premiums with
enterprise premiums, which would be fairer).
242 Sce Abraham & Weiler, supra note 28, at 403-04, 409-11; Furrow, supra note 20, at
110.
243 See Kupeli, supra note 214, at 570.
244 Sec Abraham & Weiler, supra note 28, at 407-14; Furrow, supra note 20, at 110.
245 Studdert & Brennan, supra note 31, at 227-29; Weiler, supra note 10, at 937-39.
248 Sec Studdert & Brennan, supra note 31, at 227-29; Weiler, supra note 10, at 937-39.
247 Sec Studdert & Brennan, supra note 31, at 227-29; Weiler, supra note 10, at 937-39.
248 See Weiler, supra note 104, at 227; Weiler, supra note 10, at 919-20.
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duce medical error, including error not caused by negligence. 249 Phy-
sicians might have less reason to be hesitant about sharing their con-
cerns about potential errors because their fault would not affect the
liability of the hospital. 250
 The advantages of an enterprise liability sys-
tem would be heightened by a no-fault system, which would further
relieve individual providers from their unproductive fear of liability
and give hospitals greater incentive to reduce medical error,251
Like enterprise liability; no-fault also has the problem of poten-
tially reducing the accountability of individual providers by shifting
liability to hospitals. 252 An enterprise liability system would remove the
accountability from individuals and shift it to a hospital, but hospitals
would still only lose cases when a provider is found to be at fauh. 253
Under an enterprise liability system, the law would still focus on the
individual actions of providers. 254
 This focus pressures physicians to
provide perfect care. 255
 A shift to a no-fault system would reduce this
pressure and might allow physicians to be careless without fear of ret-
ribution from the legal system.256
Alternatively; a no-fault system might make doctors more careful
because they would know that their errors, even errors that were not
the result of negligence, would still merit compensation.257 Individual
providers would have incentive to keep their hospitals happy by doing
everything they could to keep their error rates as low as possible. 258 In
a profession steeped with moral and ethical obligations, this may be
the more likely effect of a no-fault system. 259
249 See Hall, supra note 119, at 309-10; Weiler, supra note 10, at 939.
299 See Weiler, supra note 10, at 939.
51 See Weiler, supra note 104, at 228-30; Weiler, supra note 10, at 939.
52 See Kupeli, supra note 214, at 570.
299 See Abraham & Weiler, supra note 28, at 383.
294 See id.; Furrow, supra note 20, at 109.
299 See Abraham & Weiler, supra note 28, at 383.
296 See Kupeli, supra note 214, at 570. But see Weiler, supra note 104, at 223 (noting that
individual providers are already distanced from personal liability because insurance almost
always pays the costs of malpractice suits).
292
 See Weiler, supra note 10, at 938.
299 See id.
299 See PEGALIS & WACIISMAN, supra note 11, § 2:8 (listing some of the ethical guide-
lines of the practice of medicine); Weiler, supra note 10, at 938. The AMA Principles of
Medical Ethics are available at http://www.ama-assii.orgiama/pub/category/2512.hunl
(last visited Aug. 14, 2005).
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3. Which System Is Better?
Enterprise liability and no-fault would both facilitate improve-
ments in patient safety, but a no-fault system has the potential to better
serve the goal of deterring healthcare providers from injuring their
patients. 260 Under a no-fault system, efforts to improve patient safety
could thrive because individual providers could disclose errors without
fear of individual liability. 261 Additionally, a no-fault system would pro-
vide hospitals with more incentive to improve care than under an en-
terprise liability system because hospitals would have to compensate
patients even if there was 110 negligence and even if a patient did not
file a lawsuit. 262 By forcing hospitals to pay for more adverse medical
outcomes, hospitals would have a larger incentive to improve safety. 265
A no-fault system would do a better job of reducing the practice of
defensive medicine than an enterprise-liability system. 264 No-fault re-
lieves the pressure of legal liability from individual physicians more
than enterprise liability.20 The less fear physicians have of malpractice
claims, the less likely they are to prescribe unnecessary care simply to
shield themselves from liability. 266 No-fault takes an additional step in
reducing defensive medicine because medical errors that stem from
defensive care will merit compensation, even if there was no fault. 267
Thus, no-fault makeS defensive medicine even more unnecessary and
risky because defensive medicine would expose hospitals to greater li-
ability by increasing the opportunity time for medical error to occur.266
D. Requirement of EconomicFeasibility
For a medical-malpractice reform to compensate patients better
and deter malpractice, it must be feasible. 269 For purposes of this Note,
economic efficiency considers the total cost of a system: the administra-
260 Compare Abraham & Weiler, supra note 28, at 407-14 (discussing how enterprise li-
ability would work as an injury-prevention system), with Studdert & Brennan, supra note
79, at 220 (discusSing how no-fault could prevent error).
261 See Weiler, supra note 10, at 916-17, 942.
262 See Studdert & Brennan, supra note 79, at 220; Weiler, supra note 10, at 937-39.
262 See Studdert & Brennan, supra note 79, at 220; Weiler, supra note 10, at 937-39.
264 See Bovbjerg & Sloan, supra note 126, at 72; Weiler, supra note 10, at 916-17, 942.
266 See Weiler, supra note 10, at 916-17, 942.
266 See Bovbjerg & Sloan, supra note 126, at 72; Weiler, supra note 10, at 916-17, 942.
267 See Weiler, supra note 10, at 938-39.
268 Sec id. at 938-39, 942.
269 See Eleanor D, Kinney, Malpractice Reforms in the 1990s: Past Disappointments, Future
Success?, 201. HEALTH Pot,. NO( & L. 99, 99, 123-25 (1995); Studdert et al., supra note
31, at 2-3.
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tive costs relative to compensation and the amount of time necessary to
resolve medical-malpractice claims. 27°
1. Enterprise Liability
An enterprise-liability system would save costs relative to the cur-
rent medical-malpractice system. 271 The range of compensable events
would not necessarily increase. 272 Lawsuits would he more straight-
forward because patients would simply sue hospitals, not individual
providers involved in treatment. 273 Increased efficiency would reduce
the costs and time spent defending and bringing malpractice
claims.274 An enterprise-liability system would also realize savings if
improvements in patient safety materialize; thus, reducing the actual
incidence of medical malpractice and compensable events. 275 Finally,
doctors would no longer need the costly individual malpractice insur-
ance that is driving some physicians out of their practices.276
Enterprise liability also has some financial risks. 277 Implementing
an enterprise-liability system might be difficult for hospitals, especially
nonprofit hospitals or those hospitals in poor areas already operating
on a tight budget. 278
 Some hospitals are struggling to pay for emer-
gency medical care they must provide regardless of whether patients
can pay for it. 279 Giving hospitals the increased responsibility of physi-
cians' medical-malpractice liability may prove to be too much for
some hospitals.280 For this reason, any attempt to institute enterprise
liability should begin with hospitals that have the financial strength to
test the economic feasibility of the system. 281
276
	 Weiler, supra note 10, at 926.
271 See Abraham & Weiler, supra note 28, at 403-04; Jacobi & Huberfeld, supra note 29,
at 307; Weiler, supra note 104, at 224-25.
272 See Abraham & Weiler, supra note 28, at 403-04.
2" See Abraham & Weiler, supra note 28, at 403-06; Weiler, supra note 104, at 224-25.
274 See Abraham & Weiler, supra note 28, at 403-04; Jacobi & Huberfeld, supra note 29,
at 307.
275 See Abraham & Weiler, supra note 28, at 407-14.
276 See id. at 383; Geistfeld, supra note 206, at 459-60; Burages, supra note 6, at 8A.
277 See Abmhain & Weiler, supra note 28, at 423,426.
278 See id. at 423-27.
279
	 id.
255 See id.
201 See id.
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2. No-fault
A no-fault approach to medical-malpractice liability would proba-
bly be more expensive than the current negligence-based mode1. 282
With healthcare costs rising, any systemic change that increases the cost
of healthcare should be carefully scrutinized. 283 A no-fault scheme may
begin a slippery slope towards excessive compensation.284 Currently,
few of the potentially compensable claims are actually brought as medi-
cal-malpractice actions. 285 In the negligence-based medical-malpractice
system, a large investment of time and money is required to bring a
suit, and a favorable outcome for patients is far from guaranteed. 288 If
barriers to compensation were lowered, a floodgate of claims could be
opened. 287 If a no-fault system was not carefully designed to contain
costs, the surge in claims could overwhelm the financial stability of the
system. 288
Despite valid concerns about the risk of increasing the cost of
healthcare by creating a no-fault system, there may be some cost ad-
vantages relative to the current system. 289 A no-fault system might
prove to be an easier system and fairer way to manage costs. 290 Al-
though tort reform efforts such as capping punitive damages or limit-
ing the contingency fees of attorneys have been successful in reducing
the number of malpractice claims, the effects of the reforms are not
equitably spread throughout society. 291 They tend to limit options for
poor plaintiffs and for plaintiffs with difficult cases. 292
A no-fault system might make the effects of cost control mecha-
nisms more predictable and equitable. 293 For example, to reduce the
282 See Bovbjerg & Sloan, supra note 126, at 73; Studdert et al., supra note 31, at 31-32.
288 See N1Kr1. Cm. FOR If EAL'Ill STATISTICS, supra note 25, at 14, 326 (2004) (swing
national healthcare expenditures totaled more than $1.5 trillion in 2002).
284 Sec Bovbjerg & Sloan, supra note 126, at 73; Kupeli, supra note 214, at 570 (express-
ing concern about how a no-fault system would be funded).
285 SCC Hyman, supra note 10, at 1643; Weiler, supra note 10, at 913.
286 See Weiler, supra note 10, at 913.
287 See Kupeli, supra note 214, at 570; Studdert et al., supra note 31, at 2-3; Weiler, supra
note 10, at 913.
288 See Kupeli, supra note 214, at 570; Studdert et al., supra note 31, at 2-3; Weiler, supra
note 10, at 913.
289 See Studdert et al., supra note 33, at 30-31.
298 See id.; Weiler, supra note 10, at 927.
291 See Studdert & Brennan, supra note 32, at 225; Weiler, supra note 10, at 910.
292 Sec Weiler, supra note 10, at 910; Lohr, supra note 23, at BU1.
298 See Bovbjerg & Sloan, supra note 135, at 71 (stating that no-fault would make com-
pensation more efficiently delivered, better tailored to individuals, and better managed);
Weiler, supra note 10, at 921-23. But see Kupeli, supra note 229, at 569.
1122	 Boston College Law Review
	 [Vol. 46:1095
costs within a no-fault system, one might consider increasing the dis-
ability threshold necessary to receive compensation. 294 This would
control costs by eliminating some of the more minor claims, and it
would favor people with the most severe injuries. 29' Because damages
in a no-fault system would be dispersed in a regulated and controlled
fashion, it would be easier to anticipate the effect of changes in the
compensation requirements.290 In the current torts system, the un-
predictable nature of damage awards makes it difficult to anticipate
how much will be saved by cost-cutting measures and who will be af-
fected. 297
A no-fault system could be even less expensive than the existing
negligence system.298
 If the system were carefully designed to control
costs and limit payments, it does have the potential to reduce the costs
of the healthcare system. 299 A no-fault system could produce savings by
greatly reducing physician malpractice insurance, by reducing defen-
sive medicine, by increasing patient safety, and by more efficiently
compensating claimants. 390
 These savings combined with careful de-
sign might make the cost of a no-fault system an advantage instead of
a weakness."'
The current system spends about fifty-five to sixty cents on the
dollar to compensate patients for medical malpractice." 2 This is not
very efficient. 503 More patients would be compensated for the same
amounts of money under an administrative system like no-fault. 504
A no-fault system of liability might run into problems of
efficiency to the extent that it would be a much more bureaucratic
system than the negligence model."' Paper work, regulations, and
review boards could potentially choke the system with red tape. 306 The
294 See Studdert et al., supra note 31, at 10-11 (discussing how the Swedish no-fault sys-
tem controls cost); Weiler, supra note 104, at 227 (suggesting a two month injury thresh-
old).
295 See Studdert et al., supra note 31, at 10-11; Weiler, supra note 104, at 227.
295 See Studdert et al., supra note 31, at 12-13 (explaining cost control in Sweden's no-
fault system).
297 See Weiler, supra note 10, at 914.
298 See Bovbjerg & Sloan, supra note 126, at 70-73; Weiler, supra note 10, at 926-27.
299 See Studdert et al., supra note 31, at 33.
304 See Weiler, supra note 10, at 926-27.
30 See Studdert et al., supra note 31, at 33.
302 Weiler, supra note 10, at 926.
3°3 See id.
364 Sec Studdert et al., supra note 31, at 30; Weiler, supra note 10, at 926.
305 Sec Kupeli, supra note 214, at 570-71; Weiler, supra note 10, at 926.
so See Studdert et al., supra note 31, at 9-10 (describing Sweden's more administrative
no-fault system).
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initial system, subsequent. statutes, and regulations would have to be
attentive to streamlining the administrative system in order to maxi-
mize funds for patient compensation. 307
3. Which System Is Better?
Although no-fault. serves the goals of compensation and deter-
rence well, an enterprise liability system is more economically feasi-
ble.308 An enterprise liability system has two key advantages over a no-
fault system. 309 First, an enterprise liability system would not drastically
expand the number of patients or injuries meriting compensation like
a no-fault. system would.") This characteristic may be a weakness of
enterprise liability's capacity to serve the goal of compensation, but it
is an economic advantage. 3 " A no-fault system probably would in-
crease the cost of the medical-malpractice system. 312 Enterprise liabil-
ity, in contrast, should save money through increased efficiency. 313
Malpractice claims should become more predictable and lawsuits
should become streamlined and less expensive under an enterprise-
liability system.3 "
The second economic advantage enterprise liability has over no-
fault is that it should have fewer initial start-up costs.318 A no-fault sys-
tem would require all initial costs of an enterprise liability system plus
the cost of establishing an administrative body to review and process
3IY1 See id. at 5-10.
m' Compare Abraham Sc Weiler, supra note 28, at 406 (discussing how enterprise liability
would be less expensive than the current system), with Studdert et al., supra note 31, at 29-
32 (discussing the affordability of no-fault).
1°9 Compare Abraham & Weiler, supra note 28, at 406 (discussing how enterprise liability
would be less expensive than the current system), with Studdert et al., supra note 31, at 29-
32 (discussing the affordability of no-fault).
510 Compare Abraham & Weiler, supra note 28, at 393 (discussing how malpractice
would still be a requirement for imposing liability), with Studdert & Brennan, supra note
79, at 219 (explaining how a no-fault system eliminates the need to find negligence to
impose liability).
3" Compare Abraham & Weiler, supra note 28, at 406 (discussing how enterprise liability
would be less expensive than the current system), with Studdert et al., supra note 31, at 29-
32 (discussing the affordability of no-fault).
313 See Studdert et al., supra note 31, at 29-32.
313 See Abraham & Weiler, supra note 28, at 406.
314 See id.
3" Sec id. at 432.
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claims.316 Since enterprise liability is a less radical change, it should be
easier and less expensive to implement enterprise liability: 317
E. Requirement of Sociopolitical Feasibility
1. Enterprise Liability
Enterprise liability has sociopolitical appeal because it would re-
lieve physicians from individual liability.318 Physicians are a sympathetic
group to the electorate, and the success of recent tort reforms at the
state level indicates the political will to relieve the burden of malprac-
tice from physicians. 319 Also, more attention is being dedicated to the
problem of medical error and the startling number of injuries and
deaths it causes. 320 As enterprise liability promises to identify and re-
duce medical error more effectively, it could gain political momen-
tum.321
At the same time, enterprise liability may face substantial socio-
political challenges. 322 Enterprise liability fell flat as a proposed re-
form in 1996, and if anything, the interest groups that opposed the
reforms are even more powerful now.323 Enterprise liability may be
viewed as a step too close to socialized medicine to be viable in the
United States.324 Enterprise liability focuses the medical-malpractice
system on hospitals. 325 Although this focus would streamline the mal-
practice system, it would also make hospitals more involved in the
provision of care.326 The American people seem averse to socialized
medicine, and attempts to institute an enterprise liability system may,
to some, look like an attempt to enact socialized medicine. 327 By fo-
516 se, id.; Studdert et al., supra note 31, at 30.
317 Compare Abraham & Weiler, supra note 28, at 406, 432 (discussing how enterprise li-
ability could be less expensive than the current system and a bridge to later reforms), with
Studdert et al., supra note 31, at 29-32 (disucussing the costs of a no-fault system).
318 See Abraham & Weiler, supra note 28, at 382.
319 See Am. MED. Ass ' s, supra note 21, at 24-41; GAWANDE, supra note 193, at 11.
323 See Studdert & Brennan, supra note 79, at 217. See generally INST. OF MED., supra note
14.
321 See Abraham & Weiler, supra note 28, at 407-14.
322 See id. at 383.
323 See id.
324 See id. at 383-84; Keith Myers, Medical Errors: Causes, Cures, and Capitalism, 16 J.L. &
11EAurn 255, 288 (2002) (arguing that socialized medicine would reduce incentives to
reduce medical error).
323 See Abraham & Weiler, supra note 28, at 382-83.
328 Sec id. at 383.
327 See SKOCPOL, supra note 56, at 6-8, 174; Myers, supra note 324, at 288.
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cusing malpractice on hospitals, doctors would become less autono-
mous and more like employees of the hospitals. 328 Patients seem to
want their doctors to direct their care and treatment, rather than an
administrative unit such as a hospita1. 329
Involving the hospital more deeply in the provision of care seems
to compromise the intimacy and trust of the doctor-patient relation-
ship.3" These effects and perceptions of an enterprise liability system
are important because if they are not addressed, the system may never
be instituted."' American culture focuses a great deal on individual-
ism, and enterprise liability is more concerned with systems than per-
sonal relationships. 332 The existing fault-based medical-malpractice
system is focused on the individual patient and individual providers. 333
A move toward enterprise liability would sacrifice some of this indi-
vidualism. 334
An enterprise liability system also faces design challenges. 335 As
an example, how would the system deal with a malpractice claim
against a rural solo practitioner where the injury happened in the
doctor's office?"° Is it fair to assign liability to a far-off hospital that
essentially has no control over the rural physician? 337 How would you
choose which hospital should pay for an injury at a doctors' office
when the doctor has staff privileges at multiple hospitals?338 These de-
sign questions are not easy to answer. 339 The fact that enterprise liabil-
ity will be challenging to design does make it less politically and cul-
turally feasible.MO
325
 Sec Abraham & Weiler, supra note 28, at 383.
329 Sec GAWA N 1)E, supra note 193, at 11-12; Abraham & Weiler, supra note 28, at 383.
530 Sec GAwnignE, supra note 207, at 11-12; Abraham & Weiler, supra note 28, at 383.
Rut see Hall, supra note 119, at 309-10 (suggesting that a system that encourages doctors to
disclose errors to patients might improve trust).
331 SeeSKocrm, supra note 56, at 178-83; Abraham & Weiler, supra note 28, at 383.
332 Sec James A, Henderson, Jr., Why Negligence Dominates Tort, 50 UCLA L. Ittiv. 377,
404-05 (2002).
333 Sec PrIGALls &WActismAN, supra note 11, § 2:10.
334
 See Abraham & Weiler, supra note 28, at 382-83; Henderson, supra note 332, at 404—
05.
332 Sec Abraham & Weiler, supra note 28, at 415; Weiler, supra note 104, at 226 (urging
states to experiment with enterprise liability).
336 Sec Furrow, supra note 20, at 112.
337 See id.
MB See id.
336 See Id.
340 Sec SxocroL, supra note 56, at 178-79 (referring to the political volatility of a com-
plex, expensive, and bureaucratic system).
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2. No-fault
A no-fault system may have significant cultural appeal because it
would be more accepting of the fact that doctors make mistakes, and
the system would nurture forthrightness in the doctor-patient relation-
ship. 541 Americans care a great deal about their healthcare. 542 This is
reflected by how much Americans spend on healthcare. 343 The doctor-
patient relationship is the cornerstone of healthcare provision, and
doctors and patients might both be well-sefved if the relationship did
not become so adversarial when invoking the law. 544
Despite a no-fault system's cultural appeal as a more accepting
and generous way of dealing with medical error, a no-fault system
would face serious political and cultural roadblocks. 345 A no-fault sys-
tem would be more bureaucratic and administrative—adding another
layer of paperwork to an already complex system 346 This added bu-
reaucracy may also prompt cries of socialization, which may make a
no-fault system politically unrealistic. 547
Perhaps more critical than its bureaucratic and socialistic charac-
teristics, a no-fault system may not have an organized interest group to
champion it..348 Doctors seem convinced that they want damage caps
and similar medical-malpractice reforms. 349 Plaintiffs' attorneys would
probably oppose a no-fault system because they would be largely cut
out of the claims process.35° Like the AMA, the Association of Trial
Lawyers of America ("ATLA") is a powerful lobbying force. 351 Attor-
neys who bring medical-malpractice claims probably stand to lose the
341 See Furrow, supra note 20, at 122-23 (making the same argument with respect to en-
terprise liability); Studdert & Brennan, supra note 30, at 227-28.
342 See generally GAwANDE, supra note 193 (illustrating the human side of medicine).
343 See NAT'L Cm. FOR HEAL, rit STATIsTtcs, supra note 25, at 14.
344 See Studdert & Brennan, supra note 30, at 227-28. See generally Hall, supra note 119
(discussing the importance of trust in the doctor patient relationship).
343 See Kinney, supra note 269, at 123-25; Kupeli, supra note 214, at 569-70; Chandler
Gregg, Comment, The Medical Malpractice Crisis: A Problem with No Answer?, 70 Mo. L. REV.
307,311 (2005) (stating that reforms like no-fault have received little support).
346 See Weiler, supra note 10, at 931-32.
347 See SKOCP01., supra note 56, at 174 (discussing "Reagan's Revenge" and Americans'
distaste for big government and bureaucracy).
348 See Abraham & Weiler, supra note 28, at 383; Kinney, supra note 269, at 123-25 (stat-
ing that physicians are skeptical of no-fault, consumer groups are silent, and the trial bar
prefers the status quo); Gregg, supra note 345, at 311.
"9 See Am. MEI), Ass'N, supra note 21, at 23-24.
550 See Kinney, supra note 269, at 124-25; Ass'N OF TRIAL LAWYERS or AM., TEN REASONS 'ID
OPPOSE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE "REFORM", http://www.adan et.org/ContsumerMediaRe
sources/Tier3/press_room/FAC1b/medmal/tenreasons0504.aspx.
331 See Abraham & Weiler, supra note 28, at 383.
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most, if a no-fault, system were implemented.352 Attorneys would no
longer be needed for patients to receive compensation for medical
errors.353 Thus, some attorney groups probably would fight a no-fault
system aggressively. 354 Given how potent their current opposition is to
medical-malpractice reforms like damage caps, a system that largely
cuts out attorneys could be expected to generate even more opposi-
tion.355 Without strong political momentum, it is difficult to imagine
an extensive reform like no-fault being enacted. 356
3. Which System is Better?
Because an enterprise liability model more closely resembles the
current medical-malpractice system, it would alienate fewer interest
groups if implemented and he more politically feasible. 357 A no-fault
system has the cultural misfortune of being an inherently more bu-
reaucratic and administrative approach to compensating injured pa-
tients. 358 It would thus be vulnerable to claims that it would further
clog the healthcare system with paperwork and complicated rules. 353
The lawsuit-based enterprise liability system would not be vulnerable
to these kinds of attacks. 36°
No-fault's greatest political weakness is that it. would not have a
powerful interest group to champion it. 36i An enterprise liability sys-
tem would not alienate attorneys nearly as much. 362 In fact, attorneys
may even profit from an enterprise liability system. 363 Hospitals have
352 Sec Brill, supra note 213, at 1005.
353 Sec Bovbjerg & Sloan, supra note 126, at 73; Brill, supra note 213, at 1005;.
35 ' See Bovbjerg Sc Sloan, supra note 126, at 73; Brill, supra note 213, at 1005; Ass's OF Thud,
LAWYERS OF Am., HEAUlli CARE RESOURCE CENTER, IltIp://WWW.atlanet.Org/COnStlincTiVie
diaResources/Tier3/press_room/FACTS/Itealth/index.aspx (including links to articles
such as The Truth About Medical Malpractice in America, Debunking the Top 5 Myths About Medi-
cal Malpractice, and Ten Reasons To Oppose Medical Malpractice Reform).
355 See Kinney, supra note 269, at 124-25; ASS'N or TRIAL LAwYrsts OF AM., supra note
354.
956 See SKOCP01„ supra note 56, at 6-8, 174; Kinney, supra note 269, at 225; Kupeli, supra
note 214, at 569-70.
357 See SKOCPOL, supra note 56, at 6-8, 174; Abraham & Weiler, supra note 28, at 432;
Kupeli, supra note 214, at 569-70; AsS'N OF TRIAL LAWYERS or Ast,, supra note 354.
358 See SKOCP01„ supra note 56, at 174; Studdert et al., supra note 31, at 29-31.
359
	 Studdert et al., supra note 31, at 5-10.
36a Sec generally ASS'N OF TRIAL LAWYERS 01,' ' Am., supra note 26.
961 Sec Abraham & Weiler, supra note 28, at 383; Kinney, supra note 269, at 123-25.
362 Sec generally ASS'N OF TRIAL LAWYERS OF Am., supra note 354.
363 See Abraham & Weiler, supra note 28, at 403-06 (discussing improvements in pa-
tient Compensation).
1128
	 Boston College Law Review 	 [Vol, 46:1095
deep pockets and would probably settle legitimate claims more often
than doctors would.364
Although it would probably be more difficult to enact a no-fault
system, it is worth noting that enterprise liability already fizzled as a
reform during the Clinton administration. 369
 Enterprise liability faced
opposition from the AMA and the PIAA.366 Doctors may prefer a no-
fault system to enterprise liability because it eliminates the fault re-
quirement and its culture of blame.367 If this difference is sufficiently
enticing to doctors, the AMA may support no-fault reforms. 368
It is probably more likely that the AMA would oppose both en-
terprise liability and no-fault because doctors are unwilling to submit
themselves to additional control from hospitals.369 The AMA will con-
tinue to lobby for damage caps and similar reforms. 37° The AMA will
not feel pressured to compromise and support alternative reforms
like enterprise liability or no-fault because the Bush administration
and Republican Congressional majorities support damage caps and
similar reforms promoted by the AMA. 371
Enterprise liability and no-fault both face daunting political chat-
lenges.372 Enterprise liability is probably more feasible because it does
not alienate attorneys." No-fault may have no champions if both
physician and plaintiff attorneys' lobbies oppose it. 374 Without a de-
termined and well-financed lobby, it is hard to imagine a dramatic
change like no-fault overcoming political opposition and realizing the
improvements it was designed to create."
364 See id.
365 See id. at 383.
566 Id.
367 See Weiler, supra note 10, at 913.
3513 See AM. MEn. ASS'N, supra note 21, at 4-8; Abraham & Weiler, supra note 28, at 383;
Weiler, supra note 10, at 913.
369
	 Abraham & Weiler, supra note 28, at 383; Kinney. supra note 269, at 123 (stating
that physicians feel enormous personal responsibility for their patients, contributing to
their discomfort with no-fault).
370 5a/bd. MEI). ASS'N., supra note 21, at 23-45.
373 See Lohr, supra note 21, at BUI.
572 See e.g., SKocPoL, supra note 56, at 174; Kupeli, supra note 214, at 569-70.
s73 See Brill, supra note 213, at 1005; ASS'N or TRIAL LAWYERS OF AM., supra note 26. ,
374 See Brill, supra note 213, at 1005; Kinney, supra note 269, at 223-25; ASSN or TRIAL
LAWYERS OF AM., supra note 26.
376 See Brill, supra note 213, at 1005; Kinney, supra note 269, at 225; ASS'N or TRIAL
LAWYERS OF AM., supra note 26.
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F. Aggregate Weighing: Which Model Is Better?
Having evaluated enterprise liability and no-fault in terms of how
well each satisfies the goals of compensation and deterrence and
meets the requirements of economic and sociopolitical feasibility, the
question becomes which is the better reform. 376 No-fault offers
greater promise that it will serve the goals of compensation and de-
terrence, but enterprise liability is more feasible both economically
and in the current sociopolitical context. 377
Although no-fault is a promising reform because it has so much
potential to improve compensation and deterrence, enterprise liabil-
ity is a better reform because it is more feasible than no-fault. 378 The
theoretical virtues of no-fault cannot do good if the system cannot be
enacted.373 Because enterprise liability does promise to streamline
compensation and significantly improve patient safety, it is a valuable
reform that could be enacted.38°
Enterprise liability also has the advantage of being . a potential
step toward no-fault liability."' Enterprise liability could be an end in
itself or a stepping-stone for a no-fault system. 382 Because enterprise
liability is a more feasible reform, it should be implemented first. 383
Enterprise liability is a more moderate reform that leaves open the
possibility for a more radical change like no-fault. 384 At this time, no-
fault has many theoretical virtues, but its implementation remains un-
likely.385 Enterprise liability also has great promise for improving
healthcare and is a more realistic option for reform. 388
CONCLUSION
Enterprise liability is the better reform for the medical-
malpractice system because it is more economically, socially, and po-
378 See supra notes 196-375 and accompanying text.
377 See supra notes 196-375 and accompanying text.
378 Compare Abraham & Weiler, supra note 28, at 434-36 (summarizing the promise of
enterprise liability and its role as an incremental reform), with Studdert et al., supra note
31, at 32-34 (summarizing the value and affordability of no-fault).
3714 See Studdert et al., supra note 31, at 3.
38° See Abraham & Weiler, supra note 28, at 436.
381 Sec id. at 434.
"2 See id.
w See id.
384 Sec id.
395 See Sikocroi„ supra note 56, at 6-8, 174; Abraham & Weiler, supra note 28, at 434;
Kupeli, supra note 214, at 569-70.
386 SceAbraham & Weiler, supra note 28, at 434-36.
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litically feasible than a no-fault system. An enterprise liability system
also promises to serve the goals of compensation and deterrence bet-
ter than the current fault based system that targets individual provid-
ers. Although a no-fault system may better compensate patients and
deter malpractice, an enterprise liability system would be less costly
and easier to implement.. An enterprise liability system could be a step
toward a no-fault system if experience indicates no-fault would further
improve medical-malpractice law and the healthcare system.
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